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“It is some time in the future.  You are reading a weekly magazine, 
which explores how the Constitution has recently changed as a result of 
decisions of the Supreme Court.”1 So begins Cass Sunstein’s new book 
Radicals in Robes: Why Extreme Right-Wing Courts Are Wrong for America.2
1 CASS SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS ARE 
WRONG FOR AMERICA 1 (2005).  
2 It seems that Radicals in Robes has already prompted two new books by other authors 
in reaction.  See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, HOW PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION 
(2006) AND RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES (2006). Richard Epstein and Ronald Dworkin 
are both critics of Sunstein (from different ends of the spectrum, though).  Epstein’s book nowhere 
mentions Sunstein himself, or Radicals in Robes, but the back cover of the dust jacket on 
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Suppose one were to continue the quote above like this:  “After 
Democrats regained control of the Senate and White House in the 2008 
elections, vacancies on the federal judiciary, including the Supreme Court, 
have likewise drawn left-wing progressives as replacements for the 
retiring Reagan-era appointees.”  If you were a conservative, you might 
respond to this new-found political disenfranchisement by proposing a 
new rule: these judges should do nothing drastic.  Change as little as 
possible.  The goal, naturally, would be to have one’s opponents move 
slowly.  This is what Sunstein wants as well, but as his subtitle indicates, 
 
Epstein’s book sports the following quote (attributed to Charles Fried from Harvard University) in 
large print:  
Just as we are being berated by his Chicago colleague Cass Sunstein for not 
completing FDR’s social-democratic revolution by embracing a New Deal for 
speech and constitutionalizing welfare rights, here come Richard Epstein 
inviting us to wonder whether the New Deal enterprise and the Progressive 
movement that preceded it were not all a dreadful mistake.”  
Given that Sunstein’s book opens with a warning about conservatives who want to undo 
the New Deal, it seems to be a repartee when a new book appears soon thereafter 
defiantly asserting that we should do just that.  Moreover, Epstein’s preface alludes to his 
opponents who “are quite happy to place anyone opposed to their ideals in the 
‘Constitution-in-Exile’ movement” (see EPSTEIN, this note, at ix),  which is exactly what 
Sunstein does in the Introduction to his book (SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 3-5), and in 
approximately fifteen other places throughout his volume (see id. at 25-26, 31, 37, 43, 49, 
54-55, 75, 76, 131, 199 205, 221, 238, 243, 249), Epstein’s reference seems, therefore, to 
be to Radicals in Robes, although Sunstein never mentions Epstein by name in his book.   
Dworkin’s book also does not acknowledge Radicals in Robes in any of the 
footnotes or the index, but the title itself, Justice in Robes, seems to be a parody of 
Sunstein’s title – especially since Dworkin spend a fair amount of time criticizing 
Sunstein by name for being a short-sighted, amoral pragmatist who is afraid of taking a 
stronger stand for moral values like justice and equality in jurisprudence. See DWORKIN,
JUSTICE IN ROBES, at 66-73. Almost all of Dworkin’s citations to Sunstein’s writings are 
to a much earlier book by Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict (1996), which 
introduced some of the nascent ideas developed in Radicals in Robes. 
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the future is now; he wants to cabin the right-wing judges who are filling 
important judicial slots around the country. 
 This is predictable for politics, of course, but Sunstein takes pains 
early in the book to deny that his agenda is partisan, insisting instead that 
it is a neutral methodology for deciding court cases.3 Nevertheless, the 
book opens and closes with explicit attacks on the Republican agenda for 
the judiciary, and the excessively obvious overlap between the Republican 
Party platform and the decision patterns of originalist judges (whom 
Sunstein disparagingly calls “fundamentalists” throughout the book). 
Overall, the book reads somewhat like a plea for mercy or leniency by the 
politically vanquished. 
 That being said, Sunstein’s gradualist approach is right, but not for 
the reasons Sunstein says.  Judges should take baby steps, he says, because 
it shows intellectual humility.4 He quotes Judge Learned Hand for the 
point that “the spirit of liberty is that spirit which is not too sure that it is 
right.”5 Such modesty is a good thing when it reflects genuine tolerance of 
alternative (and even opposing) viewpoints; but it can also be 
indistinguishable from intellectual agnosticism, or even straightforward 
 
3 SUNSTEIN, supra note 1,. at 28-29. 
4 Id. at 34-36. 
5 Id. at 35, citing LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 190 (1953). 
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ambivalence: near the end of the book, Sunstein says languidly that his 
camp is “comfortable”6 with the Supreme Court’s decision in Lopez; their 
views are “broadly compatible with the Court’s current approach to 
campaign finance reform,”7 they feel that neutral school voucher 
programs are “probably fine,”8and are “puzzled” by distinctions between 
commercial speech, like product advertisements, and expressive speech, 
like political campaigning.9 They “resist any ambitious agenda for the 
Takings Clause,”10 preferring a piecemeal approach instead.  His 
predilection for piecemeal jurisprudence smacks of 1960’s-style 
“situational ethics,” but here it applies to grand constitutional questions.  
Unsurprisingly, he spends most of the book worrying about whether the 
results in any case would offend his political sensibilities.11 
There are, however, perfectly good free-market arguments for 
judicial incrementalism and governmental gradualism in general, even in 
the wake of previous bad decisions.  Sunstein’s proposed methodology 
would be more palatable to the people he needs to win over – instead of 
 
6 SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 239 (sounding rather ambivalent). 
7 Id.  at 232 (sounding vaguely acquiescent). 
8 Id. at 227. 
9 Id. at 230 (sounding legally agnostic). 
10 Id. at 235 (espousing intentional halfheartedness). 
11 Radicals in Robes overall seems to be a restatement and further development of ideas 
that Sunstein introduced in earlier books, especially his classic One Case At a Time (1999) and 
Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict (1996). 
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the “amen chorus” of moderate liberals – if he could pitch judicial 
gradualism as something that fits squarely within the original intent of the 
Framers, as well as classical economic thought.  This essay attempts to do 
just that.  The real brilliance of the American Constitution, I argue, is its 
tendency to foster steady economic development and general prosperity 
by creating an inherently gradualist government, including the judiciary.12 
The mechanism for this achievement is the remarkable balance between 
governmental inertia and the possibility for change and progress.  Our 
Constitution takes advantage of the tedious inefficiency of a government 
with checks and balances (and competing state and federal systems) to 
limit any changes to incremental, measured steps. This comports with the 
growing body of economic literature about the link between gradualism in 
governmental self-improvement and the overall prosperity of a society.  
Sunstein is absolutely right that courts should move one step at a time, but 
the reasons he offers are flaccid and confusing. There are much better 
reasons for following his program. 
 
12 The argument presented herein departs from the standard free-market issues like 
freedom of contract and private property rights that Richard Epstein emphasizes throughout his 
new book, How Progressives Rewrote the Constitution (see EPSTEIN, supra note 2).  Epstein focus 
primarily on these two specifically-delineated rights rather than the overall effects that the 
Separation of Powers has on the development of the free market, although he recognizes an 
implied “police power” in the structure of the Constitution.  See id. at 16-17. 
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This review essay proceeds with a critical discussion (Part I) of 
Sunstein’s misuse of nomenclature, a noteworthy feature that 
unfortunately permeates his text, and which is unnecessarily insulting to 
several parties at once.  Part II presents the case for judicial gradualism 
from a historical and free-market perspective.  This section also explores 
the nondelegation doctrine, both from Sunstein’s point of view (his 
references to it in Radicals in Robes seem to indicate a significant departure 
from his earlier writings), and from the perspective advocated in this 
article – that government radicalism is bad for the economy.  Part III offers 
a brief summary and conclusion.   
 
PART I: THE NAME GAME 
Cass Sunstein is one of the most well-known legal writers of our 
time, and for good reason: he is prolific, writes on a wide variety of 
relevant topics, and is clearly well-informed on many subjects.  He thinks 
and writes clearly, even brilliantly, and makes complicated legal doctrines 
accessible to his readers.  I strongly recommend his book, as I would all 
his other books.   
Before defending Sunstein’s ultimate thesis, however, I must object 
to his protracted misuse of certain terminology in this particular volume.  
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The craft of rhetoric sometimes requires that we group our opponents 
together and name them, usually uncharitably, and that we choose an 
appropriate moniker for our own position as well.  Such rhetorical 
nomenclature can be valuable when it brings clarity, delineating the 
dividing lines between sets of ideas or opposing perspectives. 
 Sunstein chooses some novel nomenclature, and his generates 
confusion instead of clarity.  He begins by saying that there are four main 
approaches to constitutional interpretation: perfectionism, 
majoritarianism, fundamentalism, and minimalism.13 By 
“perfectionism,”14 he seems to mean what everyone else calls “liberal 
judicial activism” or “progressive judicial activism” (or maybe aggressive 
civil libertarianism).15 Basically, he is identifying the type of judgecraft 
exemplified by Earl Warren and Thurgood Marshall.  “Majoritarianism” is 
a type of judicial self-restraint and deference to the legislature, perhaps 
represented by Oliver Wendell Holmes.16 Sunstein says neither of these 
views have proponents on the Supreme Court today; they are artifacts of 
 
13 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at the Preface, pp. xii-xiv. 
14 Id. at 31-41. 
15 Id., see also id. at 50-51, 57-58245-50. 
16 See id. at 44-51, 73, 77, and 251.  The line between “majoritarianism” and all the other 
approaches is rather blurry, because adherent of each of the other viewpoints typically claim they 
are more in line with the will of the American people.  Also, as Sunstein repeatedly admits, 
representatives like Oliver Wendell Holmes at times seem to fit in other categories, depending on 
the case and the issue. 
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history that were partly rights and partly wrong, but right enough to be 
respectable and legitimate, Sunstein feels. 
 Even here the nomenclature introduces normative values mixed 
with supposedly descriptive terms. “Perfectionist” is not the most 
common term legal writers use for the Warren Court era, not do many of 
the other academic writers whom Sunstein includes in this group use that 
name for themselves.17 “Progressives” or “civil libertarians” would have 
been fairly neutral, ascriptions that writers on both sides of the issues 
seem to accept.  Either of these would have been more informative about 
what these people believed and did.  Why insist on renaming them all 
“perfectionists?”18 The term implies goodness taken a bit too bar, well-
intentioned aspirations that went beyond what is realistic.  Sunstein is not 
merely categorizing for us a diverse assortment of writers and judges; he 
is characterizing them, telling us how to esteem them.  His odd choice of 
terms seems intended to honor and preserve their legacy as the Good 
Guys Who Just Couldn’t Stop, as if to shield their memory from mud-
slinging by modern conservatives.  Similarly, the great “majoritarians” of 
history did not call themselves that.  They thought they were “realists,” 
 
17 The main exception seems to be Henry Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 353 (1981), although Monaghan never claims that anyone else describes 
themselves this way. 
18 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 31-36, 50-51,54, 57-58, 60, 67, 77, 222,245-48.  
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“self-restrained,” or simply democratic.  Sunstein, however, wants to 
make them sound good, but not as desirable as modern “minimalists” 
(although he is hard pressed to find cases they would decide differently).  
The name harkens back to a simpler era, when “democracy” was closer to 
its plebiscite ancestors, before the complexities of twenty-first century 
governance took over.  The name also makes them sound a bit irrelevant, 
because Supreme Court that simply defers to the legislature seems rather 
superfluous.   
 The Name Game takes a more audacious turn, however, when 
Sunstein sets his sights on his real target: the “fundamentalists.”  It 
appears from reading the book that there are only three such judges alive 
today – Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas, and Judge Ginsburg of the D.C. 
Circuit – but Sunstein suggests that fundamentalists are legion, even if the 
rest of them do not have names or anything in print that he can cite. 
 Sunstein overreaches here.  Not one of the “fundamentalists” he 
mentions or quotes would ever use the name for themselves; they always 
use more informative and descriptive terms like “originalists,” 
“textualists,” or “strict constructionists.”19 Apparently none of these terms 
 
19 See, e.g., Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 
IND. L. J. (1971).  It is not uncommon to see economics literature categorizing certain economists 
as “fundamentalists,” but this is again a specialized term of art for that industry, not an analogy to 
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are pejorative enough for Sunstein, however, and he decides instead to 
use a religious term for them, one that his moderate-liberal fans will 
associate with backwardness, intolerance, bigotry, and pushiness.20 
Even the folks who call themselves “fundamentalists” would be 
offended.  Christian Fundamentalists21 would generally not consider 
Scalia or Thomas to be real Christians at all, because both are Roman 
Catholics. Fundamentalists adopted the term for themselves early in the 
twentieth century to distinguish their churches from mainline 
denominations that seemed to be discarding essential tenets of 
 
religious fundamentalists, contra Sunstein. I have found one other commentator using 
“fundamentalist” to refer to “federalists” in the environmental arena: Claire L. Huene, 
Fundamentalist Federalism: The Lack of a Rational Basis in United States V. Morrison, 9 WASH.
U. J. L. & POL’Y 353 (2002).  
Sunstein may have borrowed the analogy and expanded it (without acknowledging the 
source) from some earlier commentators, whose use of it was less rhetorical or pejorative.  See, 
e.g., VINCENT CRAPANZANO, SERVING THE WORD: LITERALISM IN AMERICA FROM THE PULPIT TO 
THE BENCH 324-26 (2000) (descriptively comparing biblical fundamentalists with legal 
textualists); Thurman Arnold, The Role of Substantive Law and Procedure in the Legal Process,
45 HARV. L. REV. 617, 646-47 (1932) (using the term – devoid of religious associations – to 
describe anti-Realists); it was also used, merely in passing, in the conclusion of Larry Kramer’s 
Supreme Court 2000 Term Foreword: We The Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 169 (2000).  None of 
these sources, however, strain the term as Sunstein does.  I cannot find any sources where judges 
or academicians describe themselves as legal “fundamentalists.” 
20 Sunstein does the same thing in two recent articles on national security, where he dubs 
his ideological opponents “national security fundamentalists,” even though their religious views 
are unknown and  irrelevant to the issues he discusses.  See Cass Sunstein, Monkey Wrench, 2005 
LEGAL AFFAIRS 36 (2005); Cass R. Sunstein, National Security, Liberty, and the D.C. Circuit. 73 
GEO. WSH. L. REV. 693 (2005). 
21 “Fundamentalism” can also apply to non-Christian religious devotees, of course, like 
Islamic Fundamentalists, at least in the American media.  I focus my discussion here on Christian 
Fundamentalism, partly due to my greater familiarity with the movement’s own literature, but also 
because the Christian groups overtly adopted the name for themselves, while it is less clear that 
“Islamic Fundamentalist” is a self-ascription; the secular media seems to have applied the term to 
radical Muslims, starting with Khomeini’s rise to power in Iran, whether they liked it or not (I 
have not found any sources where Muslims use this term for themselves).  
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Christianity22 (like belief in the deity of Christ or the virgin birth) – that is, 
the “fundamental” doctrines of the faith.23 Hijacking the name these 
religious devotees selected for themselves is not just a cheap shot at some 
radical judges; it is misleading to the reader (given the complete lack of 
 
22 The definitive exposition of the Fundamentalist position, from the standpoint of 
members in the movement is J. I. Packer, “FUNDAMENTALISM” AND THE WORD OF GOD (1958), 
affirming the description I set forth here – that Fundamentalism has always meant adherence to a 
set of essential tenets or propositional truths, as opposed to a hermeneutical approach..  Packer 
explains the origin of the term: 
The name developed out of the habit of referring to the central redemptive 
doctrines which Liberalism rejected as “the fundamentals.”  This usage dates 
back to at least 1909.  In that year there appeared the first of twelve small 
miscellany volumes devoted to the exposition and defense of evangelical 
Christianity, entitled The Fundamentals. Through the generosity of two wealthy 
Californians, the ser was sent here to “every pastor, evangelist, missionary, 
theology student, Sunday School superintendent, YMCA and YWCA secretary 
in the English-speaking world, as far as those addresses could be obtained” – 
over three million copies were eventually circulated . . . The series contained 
positive biblical expositions of the controverted “fundamentals” – the inspiration 
and authority of Scripture, the deity, virgin birth, supernatural miracles, atoning 
death, physical resurrection and personal return of Jesus Christ, the reality of 
sin, salvation by faith through spiritual regeneration, the power of prayer and the 
duty of evangelism . . . 
 This use of “the fundamentals” as a conservative slogan was echoed in 
the Deliverance which the General Assembly of the Northern Presbyterian 
Church issued in 1910, while The Fundamentals were in the process of 
publication.  This specified five items as “the fundamentals of faith and 
evangelical Christianity”: the inspiration and infallibility of Scripture, the deity 
of Christ, His virgin birth and miracles, His penal death for our sins, and his 
physical resurrection and personal return. From that time on, it seems to have 
become habitual for American Evangelicals to refer to shoe articles as “the 
fundamentals” simply.  The General Assembly’s list was adopted, with minor 
variations and additions, as the doctrinal platform of later “fundamentalist” 
organizations, of which the first was the still surviving World Christian 
Fundamentals Association, formed in 1919. 
Id. at 28-29. 
23 See MILLARD J. ERICKSON, CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 1142 (1983): 
[F]undamentalism began historically with a series of Bible conferences attended 
by people who shared a set of distinctive beliefs terms “fundamentals of the 
faith.”  Many participants discovered that they had more in common 
theologically and spiritually with some Christians bearing different 
denominational labels than they did with some members of their own 
denomination. 
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connection between any real Fundamentalists and the judges in question), 
and unnecessarily injurious to an isolated religious group.  The only 
instance I have seen of such blatant name theft is when political crackpot 
Lyndon LaRouche named his party the National Democrats in the 1980’s 
to create confusion at the ballot and steal votes for his disciple-
candidates.24 
Sunstein is usually very well-informed when he writes, but here he 
seems to betray a lack of familiarity with popular religion: “Religious 
fundamentalism usually represents an effort to restore the literal meaning 
of a sacred text.  For fundamentalists, it is illegitimate to understand the 
words of those texts in a way that departs from the original meaning or 
that allows changes over time.”25 
24 See Robin Toner,  Democrats Scrutinize LaRouche Bloc, New York Times March 30, 
1986, Section 1; Part 1, Page 22; Kevin Klose, LaRouche Followers Gained in Black 
Wards;Analysis of Illinois Primary Upset Shows Ballots Were Cast Against Regular Democrats, 
THE WASHINGTON POST March 30, 1986, at A3; John Dillin, Lyndon LaRouche has got America's 
attention now! CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR March 27, 1986 at 1. For discussion of this event in 
the academic literature, see Angela P. Harris, Vultures in Eagles' Clothing: Conspiracy and Racial 
Fantasy in Populist Legal Thought, 10 MICH. J. L. & RACE 269,  322 n. 195 (2005); Bradley A. 
Smith, Judicial Protection of Ballot-Access Rights: Third Parties Need Not Apply, 28 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 167, 208 (1991); Richard D. Friedman, Some Modest Proposals on the Vice-Presidency,86 
MICH. L. REV. 1703, 1739 n. 109 (1988); Francine Miller, Fairness in the Election Arena: 
Congressional Regulation of Federal Ballot Access, 32 N.Y.L.SCH. L. REV. 903 (1987); Karl D. 
Cooper, Note, Are State-Imposed Political Party Primaries Constitutional? The Constitutional 
Ramifications of the 1986 Illinois LaRouche Primary Victories, 4 J.L. & POL. 343, 373 (1987); 
See also Entry, Lyndon LaRouche, available online at the following address: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lyndon_LaRouche (last visited May 15, 2006).  
25 SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at xiv. 
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Wrong.  Most Fundamentalists take the Scriptures very literally, 
but make little or no attempt to determine the original meaning of the 
words themselves.26 They take the text at face value and apply it, as they 
understand it, quite rigorously and consistently (unfashionably so).  It is 
the more liberal/modernist schools of theology that strain to discover 
original meaning using interpretive tools like the historical-critical 
method, form criticism, structural criticism, evolutionary approaches to 
ancient grammar, and anthropology of religion.27 Fundamentalists have a 
hermeneutic that might be analogous to strict textualism (Scalia’s 
approach to statutory construction, not a subject of Sunstein’s book),28 but 
they are largely unconcerned about what the Apostle Paul was thinking 
 
26 See, e.g., ERICKSON, supra note 23at 251: 
[T]his has also been the position of American fundamentalism of the twentieth 
century. Those who hold this position see an objective quality in the Bible that 
automatically brings one into contact with God; a virtually sacramental view of 
the Bible can result.  The Bible as a revelation and an inspired preservation of 
that revelation is also regarded as having an intrinsic efficacy.  A mere 
presentation of the Bible or exposure to the Bile is per se of value, for the words 
of the Bible have power in themselves. 
27 See generally Ernest R. Sandeen, Origins of Fundamentalism, in RELIGION IN 
AMERICAN HISTORY 415-27 (John M. Mulder & John F. Wilson, eds. 1978) 
28 Hermeneutics, however, are “only part of the Fundamentalist enterprise,” as seen 
below:  
To a large extent, the difference between fundamentalism and liberalism is a 
difference in world-view.  The conservative operates with a definite 
supernaturalism – God resides outside the world and intervenes periodically 
within the natural processes through miracles. The conservative sees reality as 
occupying more than one level.  The liberal, on the other hand, tends to have a 
single-story view of reality. 
ERICKSON, supra note 23, at 304.  
 It is also worth noting that “textualism” is not necessarily the same thing as “literalism,” 
as the former could consider the context in which the word occurs, and the latter could 
focus only on lexicographical meaning, independent of sentence context. 
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when he wrote his Epistles, or what Jeremiah’s original audience would 
have thought he meant.29 The Scriptural words did not come from the 
writer, but from God Himself, with the writer functioning more as a 
scribe. Sunstein mischaracterizes the people who proudly call themselves 
Fundamentalists, and uses the term for judges they would consider 
unbelievers. 
Sunstein tries to backpedal a bit and adds, “I do not mean to say 
anything about religious fundamentalism,”30 but proceeds to misuse the 
term until the last page of the book.  He ends this same paragraph saying 
that “fundamentalists” will “make Americans much less free than they are 
now.”31 This is exactly what most of his audience thinks about religious 
Fundamentalists who vie for political power, because the Religious Right 
constantly complains that our society has become too permissive, 
licentious, and immoral.  Sunstein’s real targets (the three judges 
 
29 The seminal work on Fundamentalism, at least within the movement (arguably its 
manifesto, in fact), is J. I. Packer’s early work entitled “FUNDAMENTALISM” AND THE WORD OF 
GOD (1958). His section on “The Interpretation of Scripture” (pp. 101-14) explains that his 
espoused literalism starts with a nod toward the idea of an original writer and audience, but 
quickly moves to an emphasis on the direct accessibility of the text to modern readers, the rule for 
letting Scripture interpret itself, and the need for the Holy Spirit to tell the reader the meaning; 
originalism is not central to the hermeneutic at all, and is ultimately rather inconsistent with it.   
See also JAMES T. DRAPER, JR., AUTHORITY: THE CRITICAL ISSUE FOR SOUTHERN BAPTISTS 45-79 
(1984) (echoing the same points). 
See also, the discussion in SYNDEY E. AHLSTROM, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE 
AMERICAN PEOPLE 772-74 (1972).  For examples of the approach at originalism that 
Fundamentalists reject (contrary to what Sunstein says), see generally E. P. SANDERS, PAUL, THE 
LAW, AND THE JEWISH PEOPLE (1983); LLOYD GASTON, PAUL AND THE TORAH (1987).   
30 SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at xiv.
31 Id. 
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mentioned above) would rightly feel slighted, because their platform is 
not that Americans are too free, but that we labor under a burden of 
Byzantine federal bureaucracy, undemocratic infringement on local self-
governance, and endless entitlements that undermine our merit-based 
systems of education and job placement.32 
Continuing with the religious motif, Sunstein calls his sect the 
“minimalists,” suggesting a thoughtful, Zen-like jurisprudence, something 
both harmless and enlightened.  “Minimalist” conjures up images of 
jurisprudes who are disciplined, contemplative sojourners, carefully 
preserving the harmony of their environment.  It is legitimate, of course, 
for a person to adopt a name for oneself or one’s own ideas.  Even so, not 
all self-appellations are equally helpful or benign.  “Incrementalist” would 
have been more descriptive and informative (I shall use it hereafter), 
unless one is troubled by the slight semantic suggestion with “going in a 
certain direction.”  Perhaps Sunstein wants judges to move in haphazard 
directions, or maybe he wants his camp to be inclusive of as many people 
as possible, even those with opposite ideas of where the courts should be 
 
32 These issues, in fact, are the ones for which Sunstein takes them to task throughout the 
rest of the book.  His point in the Preface seems to be that their misguided views would 
inadvertently make America less free, despite the good intentions of constitutional originalists – 
nowhere does he suggest that this set of radical judges are excessively Puritanical.  The real 
Christian Fundamentalists, however, are unabashedly anti-libertine.   
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moving.33 “Minimalism,” though, is laden with unrelated religious and 
aesthetic connotations.34 
Categorizing Supreme Court Justices on their interpretive methods 
is fine (albeit unoriginal35), but Sunstein’s Name Game is beneath a person 
of his intellectual caliber and self-ascribed cautious temperament.36 
Instead of using religious terms (even “Perfectionist” really comes of the 
theological traditions of John Wesley),37 he could have used something – 
anything – more secular, neutral, and descriptive. If he had used the terms 
only in passing this would be a mere quibble on my part, certainly not 
warranting a documentary defense of Fundamentalists; but he insists on 
using these terms, especially “fundamentalist,” as a sustained quasi-
religious metaphor from beginning to end. 
 
33 For example, Sunstein explains inclusively, “[T]he minimalist camp is large and 
diverse. We can even imagine minimalists with fundamentalist leanings.”  Id. at 30. 
34 “Minimalism” could also have the unpleasant double meaning of doing next-to-
nothing, i.e., “shirking.” 
35 See, e.g., R. Randall Kelso, Styles of Constitutional Interpretation and the Four Main 
Approaches to Constitutional Interpretation in American Legal History, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 121 
(1994) (offering a different foursome for constitutional interpretation: natural law, formalist, 
Holmesian, and instrumentalist).  
36 See id. at 30 (“Minimalists are cautious by nature…”). 
37 See generally JOHN WESLEY, A PLAIN ACCOUNT OF CHRISTIAN PERFECTION (1777); 
Melvin Deiter, The Wesleyan Perspective, in FIVE VIEWS ON SANCTIFICATION 9-46 (Melvin 
Deiter, ed. 1987); ALHSTROM, supra note 27, at 327-27; ERICKSON, supra note 21, at 971-74. 
There were earlier sects in church history who were perfectionists as well – like the Hesychasts in 
the medieval Eastern Orthodox Church and the Jansenists in counter-Reformation Europe, but 
Wesley was the first to take the notion mainstream through his Methodist Church, especially in the 
United States in the early nineteenth century. 
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PART II.  THE RIGHT THING FOR THE WRONG REASON 
A. Wrong Reason 
Apart from his misnomers, Sunstein’s proposal is correct: judges 
should confine themselves to small steps, and the Constitutional itself 
warrants this approach.  Sunstein’s purported reasons, however, are not 
as strong as they could be.  Besides the obvious hint in his title that 
today’s radical judges are bad because they are conservative, he offers two 
main justifications for his approach.  First, judges can never be sure if they 
are absolutely right, he says, so it is more prudent to avoid hasty moves or 
big steps.38 He notes a few cases where sweeping moves to the left have 
backfired (most notably Roe v. Wade),39 fueling the right-wing political 
triumph (and hence, judicial appointments) he now laments.40 
38 SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 35. 
39 Id. at 106 (“Minimalists are greatly embarrassed by Roe, and rightly so.  This was the 
Court’s first encounter with the abortion question, and the Court badly overreached, deciding 
many issues unnecessarily.”). 
40 Id. at 105.  This is one of the more interesting passages in the book: 
Roe is a crucial decision for women’s groups, many of whose members have 
long seen the ruling as central to women’s equality.  But from the standpoint of 
equality, the Court’s decision has been a mixed blessing.  The decision in Roe 
almost certainly contributed to the defeat [of] the Equal Rights Amendment.  It 
also helped to demobilize the women’s movement and at the same time to 
activate the strongest opponents of that movement. . . .Democrats have made 
preservation of Roe a central issue in presidential elections, and many 
Republican leaders have made it clear that they would like the Court to overrule 
the decision.  But if Roe were overrules, Democrats would almost certainly be 
helped and Republicans would almost certainly be hurt.  Everyone knows that if 
abortion really becomes an active issue again – if abortion might actually be a 
crime – then countless Americans will vote for pro-choice candidates. A judicial 
decision to overrule Roe would immediately create a major crisis for the 
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Second, the only real alternative to his position of minimalism, he 
suggests, is the agitated, retrograde “fundamentalism” (a.k.a. originalism) 
he so deplores, which will produce alarmingly bad results if left 
unchecked.41 Both justifications are inherently philosophical, even if 
superficial.  The first seems to be an epistemological point about the 
fallibility of human judgment, the unknowable nature of complete truth.  
The second point us essentially consequentialist or utilitarian, that is, the 
result would be bad, the end of America as we know it.  Like most 
teleological arguments, however, it walks on stilts of deontological 
assertions and assumptions.  He assumes that it would simply be bad to 
have more guns on the streets, bad to have no affirmative action, bad to 
have restrictions on the sale of contraceptives (a strikingly improbable 
scenario, but one he fears anyway), and bad to have a state like Utah 
somehow endorse the Mormon Church42 more than it already does.  
Perhaps each of these claims is correct; maybe all these things would be 
bad. They are still value judgments nonetheless, entangled with 
 
Republican Party.  Some red states would undoubtedly turn blue or at least 
purple. 
Id. 
41 See id. at 1-3. 
42 Id. at 2. 
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utilitarian, results-oriented arguments.  Sunstein’s arguments for hesitant 
decision-making are, in the end, philosophical. 
Hesitancy can signal different things.  An unwillingness to take big 
steps (or leaps of faith) can reflect fear, laziness, apathy, agnosticism, 
modesty, or even conscientiousness; the motivations are not always clear, 
and sometimes mixed.  In public policy, for example, the line between 
agnosticism and simple ambivalence is gray.  After Sunstein goes to great 
length to criticize the “perfectionist” judges for their drastic measures, he 
suggests that sometimes judges simply have to take drastic measures to 
do the right thing.  An underlying moral universe props up his arguments 
for minimalism; but if morality is our real basis, then drastic measures 
should not scare us.43 
In other words, the problem with type of “minimalism” is that it 
can easily function as a cloak for judicial cowardice.44 The judge may 
simply be afraid to do the right thing, or afraid to admit his real reason for 
 
43 Ronald Dworkin’s main criticism of Sunstein’s ideas is that Sunstein claims to be 
avoiding morals as a basis for judicial decision, insisting on incompletely theorized holdings and 
pragmatic baby steps, while at the same time making many moral assumptions along the way.  See 
Dworkin, JUSTICE IN ROBES, supra note 2, at 66-73.  Dworkin, however, wants Sunstein to be 
more moralistic, to be willing to do whatever is the “right thing” in a given case, regardless of how 
drastic it may be.   
44 In fairness to Sunstein, he acknowledges this point: “If you have no doubt that your 
own theory is right, as fundamentalists and perfectionists tend to, then minimalism will seem a 
dodge or even a form of cowardice.”  SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 37.  Unfortunately, he moves on 
in his description of the opposing view, without offering a clear answer to this objection – besides 
the epistemological assumption that we can never be sure if we are correct. 
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doing it.  Some legal questions are unavoidably controversial, and they 
are often controversial because they confront us with a problem in our 
traditional rules.  If a situation arises where doing the right thing would 
contravene our time-honored traditions, this does not really introduce a 
question about the right thing to do, nor is there any question that this 
will make many people upset.  That is the nature of a controversial 
question. 
It is insulting to both sides in such situations to mask or justify a 
significant change as merely technical.  This is what Sunstein seems to 
advocate in these dilemmas.  Indeed, stuffing a grand social controversy 
into a box of tiny technicalities simply invites the other side to search for a 
better test case to get the result they want, the result that seems right to 
them.  Judicial cowardice masked as minimalism can prolong the agony, 
as in Powell v. Alabama, or even Dred Scott and Plessy. 
It is true that doing the right thing in a controversial case can 
produce problems later on, given the natural tendency for exceptions to 
swallow the rule.  When the right result is in conflict with the traditional 
rules, it does not mean that those rules were all wrong all along.45 It 
means only that the rule was imperfect or incompletely developed, as all 
 
45 This seems to be one of Dworkin’s points in Justice in Robes, or at list an implication 
of his discussion of pragmatism.  See DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 66-73. 
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rules are.  Later judges can address this problem by showing the same 
fortitude, and doing the right thing again if the previous change has run 
its course or gone too far. The value of incrementalism is not just that 
undoing a small mistake is easier than undoing a big one; gutsy judges 
can do either.  Either minimalism or activism can actually be self-
perpetuating.  Courageous jurisprudence requires judges to overhaul 
everything a few decades later; tinkering with technicalities invites 
tinkering again and again, reducing the law to something as banal as 
resetting a thermostat. 
I am not saying that drastic, ideologically-driven decisions are 
desirable.  The point is that epistemological self-doubt and the prospect of 
major goof-ups cannot in themselves warrant judicial restraint.  Self-doubt 
will only restrain us until a case arises where we have strong feelings 
about the principles involved – a situation where those nagging doubts 
dissipate because we feel passionately.  Scary results, on the other hand, 
are correctable by the next judge, or even the other branches of 
government.  
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B.  The Right Reason 
Incrementalism is desirable because it creates systematic stability, 
which in turn fosters economic growth – more investment and more 
productivity. Recent academic literature suggests that gradualism in 
governance is better for a country.46 This is more than the tired truism 
that “people can plan their activities accordingly if the rules are 
predictable” – an adage that Scalia himself uses to justify his approach, 
because it would eventually produce pure rigidity in our legal system (he 
compares the Constitution to stone, in fact).  In fact, most of us do not plan 
any of our activities around the Constitution.  Few of us worry ahead of 
time about using our Miranda rights, or worry about the nondelegation 
doctrine, think about how best to discriminate against other races, or 
foresee the upcoming need for an abortion.  Almost none of the rights and 
 
46 See, e.g., Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislative Allocation Of Delegated Power: 
Uncertainty, Risk, and the Choice Between Agencies and Courts, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1035 (2006) 
(demonstrating that Congress delegates more discretion to the courts when they want more 
stability over time, and are less concerned about inter-issue consistency); S. Nuri Erbas, Primer on 
Reforms in a Second-Best Ambiguous Environment: A Case for Gradualism, (March 2002), IMF 
WORKING PAPER NO. 02/50 AVAILABLE AT SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=879451; Marcello 
Basili, Knightian Uncertainty in Financial Markets: An Assessment, (February 2000), UNIVERSITY 
OF SIENA, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, WP NO. 281. AVAILABLE AT SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=237279; Claire A. Hill, How Investors React to Political Risk, 8 DUKE J. 
COMP. & INT’L. L. 283, 297-309 (1998) (discussing investor skittishness in response to any signs 
of political turmoil); S. Nuri Erbas, Ambiguity, Transparency, and Institutional Strength, (July 
2004). IMF Working Paper No. WP/04/115 Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=878939;
Matthias Busse and Carsten Hefeker, Political Risk, Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment,
(April 2005). HWWA Discussion Paper No. 315. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=704283; Campbell R. Harvey, Country Risk Components, the Cost of 
Capital, and Returns in Emerging Markets, Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=620710.
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freedoms Sunstein says are at stake are things that a responsible person 
needs to plan around. 
The real concern is the risk of shocks to the system, and this is the 
best reason for incremental rulemaking.  The possibility of sudden, radical 
moves by any governmental branch introduces genuine uncertainty into 
many facets of society.47 People are averse to uncertainty, even more than 
they are averse to risk.48 They will steer their resources away from it 
when possible.  Where uncertainty prevails, it stifles investment49 and 
generates unnecessary losses.50 Most people will not invest money, time 
or labor where there is uncertainty looming; and those who do invest 
under these circumstances usually lose.  Uncertainty is different than risk; 
we are compensated for taking risks  through simple interest on our 
investment, and we can insure against known, calculable risks as much as 
we like.  Pioneer economist Frank Knight famously demonstrated that the 
premium investors expect in risky ventures is not really profit, but a 
combination of compensation for opportunity costs and the likelihood of 
 
47 See generally Paul Slovic, Perceived Risk, Trust, and Democracy, reprinted in THE 
PERCEPTION OF RISK 316-326 (Paul Slovic, ed. 2000). 
48 See, e.g., Paolo Ghirardato and Massimo Marinacci, Risk, Ambiguity, and the 
Separation of Utility and Beliefs" (February 2001). CALTECH SOCIAL SCIENCE, WORKING PAPER 
NO. 1085, Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=260578.
49 See Takao Asano, "Portfolio Inertia under Ambiguity" (June 2004). ISER DISCUSSION 
PAPER NO. 609. AVAILABLE AT SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=562561.
50 See, e.g., Jürgen Eichberger, David Kelsey, and Burkhard Schipper, "Ambiguity and 
Social Interaction" (November 21, 2005). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=464242
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losses.51 Uncertainty occasionally yields windfall profits for the 
extraordinarily lucky investor (Knight showed that these are the only 
“true” profits in any meaningful sense of the term),52 but these occasional 
bonanzas are not enough to offset the aggregate losses of the less 
fortunate, who are much greater in number.53 
Daniel Ellsberg further developed the distinction between risk and 
uncertainty renaming uncertainty “ambiguity” in his writings), showing 
 
51 See generally FRANK KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT (1927).  To 
summarize, risk involves multiple possible outcomes of a scenario, where the odds of each 
outcome are fairly clear and quantified.  An example would be a bet (or lottery or raffle) where the 
chances of winning are one in fifty; or, for that matter, the Reader’s Digest Sweepstakes, which 
typically has odds on the order of one in two hundred million. Uncertainty, in contrast, involves 
either unknown or unknowable possible outcomes.  Knightian uncertainty may involve a finite set 
of reasonable possibilities where it is impossible to ascertain beforehand which is more likely, or 
how much more likely.  Of course, uncertainty could refer to an infinite range of outcomes or 
possibilities as well.  See also Johan Deprez, Risk, Uncertainty, and Nonergodicity in the 
Determination of Investment-Backed Expectations: A Post Keynesian Alternative to Posnerian 
Doctrine in the Analysis of Regulatory Takings, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1221, 1237-46 (2001); 
Claire A. Hill, How Investors React to Political Risk, 8 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L. L. 283, 297-309 
(1998) (discussing investor skittishness in response to any signs of political turmoil); See 
generally John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with 
Legal Sanctions, 70 VA. L. REV. 965 (1984) (arguing generally that uncertainty overdeters and 
underdeters the wrong people respectively); Louis Kaplow, Optimal Deterrence, Uninformed 
Individuals, and Acquiring Information about Whether Acts are Subject to Sanctions, 6 J. L. ECON.
& ORG. 93 (1990).  
52 Laypersons typically use “profits” to refer to “net revenue,” that is, the leftover money 
after a business has paid all its bills.  Frank Knight’s argument (throughout his entire book, really) 
is that much or all of this net revenue is simply direct compensation for the entrepreneur’s 
opportunity costs, compensation for the manager’s talent and expertise, interest (accounting for the 
future discounted value of the original investment, and perhaps compensation for actuarial risk.  
All of these are actually costs that should be included in the other accounts payable that form the 
difference between gross revenue and net revenue.  This implies, of course, that most businesses 
are not terribly “profitable” at all, but are simply repaying the initial investment. 
53 I am indebted to Professor Henry Smith at the Yale Law School for first drawing my 
attention to Frank Knight and the implications of the distinction between risk and uncertainty in 
his article Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 
Yale L. J. 1, 32 n. 122 (2000) (with Thomas W. Merrill); Smith has discussed additional 
applications of the distinction in subsequent articles, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1719, 1724 (2004) and Governing the Tele-Commons, 22 YALE J. REG. 289, 303-04 (2005. 
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that individuals act “as though the worst were somewhat more likely than 
his best estimates of likelihood,” which would “indicate he distorted his 
best estimates of likelihood, in the direction of increased emphasis on the 
less favorable outcomes and to a degree depending on his best estimate.”54 
Ellsberg conducted famous experiments in which subject faced two urns, 
M and N, which each contained on hundred red or black balls.  Subjects 
were informed that Urn M contained exactly half red and half black balls; 
the other contained an unknown proportion of each.  They placed bets on 
the subject’s ability to draw a black ball from either urn.  Participants 
showed a strong preference for Urn M, for which they knew the likelihood 
of winning (fifty percent).  This represented a contradiction to the classic 
ration-actor model of economic thought, because the subjects had no 
rational basis for such a consistent preference—uncertainty was just as 
likely to favor them, especially when compared to a fifty-fifty chance, as it 
was to disfavor them.  Numerous subsequent experiments have verified 
this pattern of human decision-making; which decision theorists now call 
Ellsberg’s Paradox.  Uncertainty can take the form of straightforward 
ambiguity—the individual knows the set of possible outcomes, but cannot 
ascertain the relative likelihood of one as opposed to another.  
 
54 Daniel Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguity and the Savage Axioms, 75 Q. J. ECON. 643 (1961). 
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Alternatively, uncertainty can take the form of the individual’s 
recognition that there are unknown or hitherto unimagined possible 
outcomes of a situation, an awareness of one’s own ignorance.  This latter 
type of uncertainty would not apply to Ellsberg’s experiment, of course, 
because the subjects knew that they would draw either a black ball or a 
red one; there was no chance of drawing yellow or blue.   
Applying uncertainty principles to legal settings can implicate 
either type.  Individuals will sometimes face discreet possible outcomes, 
such as winning or losing a case, but may have unquantifiable odds for 
either outcome (as when the case is based on a novel but compelling 
argument, or where both parties have very poor evidence for their side).  
Jurisdiction and venue questions, such as whether one’s criminal case will 
be prosecuted in state court or federal court, also provide finite sets of 
options but (sometimes) uncertain probabilities of one outcome actually 
occurring. Other situations confront us with unknown possible 
outcomes—the amount of punitive damages in a newer type of mass tort 
claim, for example, or the types of torts for which we may become victims. 
As stated in the introduction of this essay, the real brilliance of our 
Constitution is how it encourages economic development and general 
prosperity; the great democracy experiment would have failed if the 
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nation had languished indefinitely in Third-World type poverty.  The 
Constitution gave us a perfectly inefficient government that allows for just 
the right amount of change or progress – without destabilizing the entire 
system.  It confines the government to baby steps.  The advantage of baby 
steps is not only that they are easy to backtrack (one of Sunstein’s core 
premises), but that they are very steady and stable. 
The Framers (as evidenced in the Federalist Papers)55 wanted a 
permanent tension between the states and the national government, and 
between the three branches of government on each level (or more, if we 
count bicameral legislatures as two).  The multi-tiered, multi-directional 
logjam that would inevitably result was thought to forestall factions from 
seizing control while the rest of us went about our business, and then 
wreaking havoc with the country.56 
55 Other examples are cited below, but James Madison observes that aversion to 
uncertainty - even by the dominant, powerful majority in a society - is what leads people to submit 
to a government in the first place.  See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (JAMES MADISON) (“. . . even 
the stronger individuals are prompted, by the uncertainty of their condition, to submit to a 
government which may protect the weak as much as themselves. . .”). 
56 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (JAMES MADISON). It is interesting how Madison 
lists “instability”  first on the list of problems with factions, before injustice or self-interest, and 
the idea is prominent throughout: 
The friend of popular governments never finds himself so much alarmed for 
their character and fate as when he contemplates their propensity for this 
dangerous vice: [The] instability, injustice, and confusion introduced into public 
councils, have, in truth, been the mortal diseases under which popular 
governments have everywhere perished; as they continue to be the favorite and 
fruitful topics from which the adversaries to liberty derive their most specious 
defamations.  [Complaints] are everywhere heard from our most considerate and 
virtuous citizens equally friends of public and private faith, and of public and 
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Factions can be ideological, but they can also be ethnic, regional, or 
aligned around some common interest (economic, religious, etc.).57 The 
more modern term is “interest group,” but “interest group” carries an 
inherent recognition of the obstacles our government presents to getting 
one’s way; “factions” at the time of the Framers could be more ambitious. 
Why are factions wrong? We might say they are inherently undemocratic, 
putting the interests of a few over the good of the many.58 Indeed, 
unrepresentative, non-majoritarian governments can be tyrannical.  Yet 
they are not necessarily so.  “Benevolent autocrat” is not an oxymoron – 
Plato conceived of a benign philosopher-king, and ancient Israel awaited 
an all-powerful, all-wise Messiah.59 Certainly dissidents in Hitler’s 
Germany constituted a faction, but one we all wish had seized power.  
Admittedly, good factions seem less likely to seek absolute power than ad 
 
personal liberty, that our governments are too unstable, that the public good is 
disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and that measures are too often 
decided, not according to rules of justice and the rights of the minor party, but 
by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority . . . [The] 
distresses under which we labor [must] be chiefly, if not wholly, effects of the 
unsteadiness and injustice with which a factious spirit has tainted our public 
administrations.  (Emphasis added). 
57 Id. Madison lists the “latent causes of factions” in this order: ideological zeal over 
religious views and political views; sentimental attachment or loyalty to individual leaders – either 
excessively ambitious people or celebrities; and then (Madison calls this one “the most common 
and durable source of factions”) economic self-interest (property distribution, creditor-debtor 
rights, etc.). 
58 Madison makes this point, but only after mentioning how factions destabilize society.  
Id.  
59 Madison’s point about this in The Federalist was that enlightened statesmen are 
theoretically possible, but an endless succession of enlightened rulers is not.  See id. 
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ones.  Even so, benevolent factions – enlightened technocrats, if you will – 
are conceivable.   
In fact, there are two inherent problems in factions, which would be 
mutually exclusive except that they occur sequentially, not 
simultaneously.  The first is that factions – regardless of whether they are 
malevolent – are inherently drastic.  They care enough to fight for control 
of the government, or to force things in the direction they want.  Factions 
form over all sorts of causes and shared goals, but they all tend to upset 
the applecart.  Exacerbating the tendency for factions to be drastic is the 
tendency of group members to reinforce each other’s point of view to the 
point where a type of tunnel vision set in.60 The myopic perspectives 
lead to decisions that are even more imbalanced.  In any case, when a 
government’s structure makes it susceptible to quick action and sweeping 
change, both traits will inevitably characterize it before long.  Drastic 
change introduces pervasive uncertainty, even if the changes themselves 
were good – nobody knows what may come next.  This uncertainty, as 
mentioned above, has a chilling effect on all economic activity.  Not all 
shocks are morally bad, but the looming possibility of an unknown 
number and variety of shocks is bad for economic development.  The 
 
60 Sunstein himself talks about this problem, but only in regard to the conservative judges 
with whom he disagrees. 
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ongoing potential for shocks – persistent uncertainty on a large scale – is 
the problem.  It paralyzes a society and sends the economy into a coma. 
The second problem inherent in factions illustrates the other side of 
our Constitution’s elegance, the possibility of incremental reform.  
Factions inherently have an entrenchment effect.  Once power is 
consolidated in the hands of a few who like to wield it (for better or 
worse), the system is restructured to resist further change, including 
incremental slippage.  Without a full-scale revolution, dislodging a faction 
– or changing anything at all – becomes nearly impossible.61 The faction 
orchestrates a deadlock in the system so no progress can occur.  This is 
problematic, because some change and adaptation over time is necessary, 
for economic growth and sustained development.  There is an optimal 
level of government inertia, beyond which the system ossifies, becoming 
too rigid. 
Scalia, as Sunstein rightly points out, wants a Constitution “set in 
stone,” a bright-line rule of law.  He says that then people will be able to 
plan accordingly, and he is exactly right – but therein lays a problem.  
When rules and government activity becomes too predictable and rigid, 
 
61 James Madison asserts that the drastic measures necessary to prevent or unseat a 
faction are even worse than the problem of having a faction itself, it is “worse than the disease,” 
because it simply perpetuates an escalating cycle of turbulence.  The FEDERALIST NO. 10 (JAMES 
MADISON).  
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people eventually find ways around all the rules, discovering every 
possible loophole.62 The problem of loopholes makes laws less relevant 
and enables the wealthier, more established interests to exploit the rules in 
their favor,63 because the wealthy have more ex ante information about 
the laws.  The result of excessive rigidity in our legal system would be 
monopoly rents in commerce, monopolization of political power, and 
even monopolization in religion and education.64 As stated before, we do 
 
62 Highly specific terms create loopholes, which are most likely to be known by insiders 
in a regulated industry or community (although this only sometimes pertains to criminal law). 
Complexity and specificity in regulatory terms, therefore, are indications of “agency capture” by 
the regulated community itself.  For an excellent discussion of the problem of loopholes, See 
Michael F. Ferguson and Stephen R. Peters, But I Know It When I See It: An Economic Analysis of 
Vague Rules, unpublished manuscript available for download at the following URL:  
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=218968 at 5 (“[I]f regulators are ‘captured’ by 
industry, then regulations will tend to be less vague and, consequently, overly strict.  These more 
specific (and strict) regulations effectively provide industry insiders with a roadmap that enables 
them to uncover and exploit loopholes, and insulates them from outside competition.”).  They 
conclude their article with a helpful example:
An amusing illustration of the tradeoff between specificity and loophole creation 
appears in George Orwell’s Animal Farm. When the animals take over the farm 
from its human owners they paint some very general rules (the “seven 
commandments”) on a barn wall including, “No animal shall sleep in a bed,” 
“No animal shall drink alcohol,” and “No animal shall kill any other animal.”  
As time passes the pigs on the farm take control and amend the rules to permit 
activities they wish to pursue.  Loopholes are created in each case by making the 
rules more detailed and precise.  The three noted above become, “No animal 
shall sleep in a bed with sheets,” “No animal shall drink alcohol to excess,” and, 
“No animal shall kill any other animal without cause.” 
Id at 24. 
63 Too much certainty leads to erosion of the rule of law as people are able to find 
loopholes to circumvent the literal terms of the law; this loophole problem leads to additional 
injustice because it is inherently anti-redistributive; those who can afford ex ante legal counsel 
escape liability while still pursuing the socially harmful activities, while the poor bear the costs of 
the legal sanction regime. See Ferguson & Peters, id. at 25 (discussing the wealth-favoring 
loophole issue, but not focusing on the injustice of the increased inequality) 
64 For example, many municipalities now threaten legal action against religious groups 
that meet in homes for services or Bible studies, usually citing zoning ordinances for legal 
authority.  Enforcement involves nearly unfettered prosecutorial discretion, of course.  A local 
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not want so much change that potential shocks always loom before us.  
Yet neither do we want the monopolization of every aspect of society that 
 
chapter of the NRA, Girl Scouts, Tupperware parties, Hell’s Angel’s meetings, or Klansmen could 
meet freely (not implying any connection between these examples), while the city zeroes in on a 
small religious group.  Of course, some rules affect everyone – fire codes, noise-nuisance rules, 
etc. – but the restrictions in some of these cases target religion. 
Constitutional issues aside, religious home groups present interesting practical issues.  
Churches (I’m going to switch to this term for shorthand, but I mean to include any type of 
religious group) are different than Scouts or the local NRA: they sing, they grow, they like to meet 
more and more frequently as more people come, and they attract families.  Families come in 
family cars (lots of minivans), which they park up and down the street; in contrast, parents often 
drop their little Scouts off for their meetings and pick them up afterward. (Let’s forget about the 
motorcycle club for a minute).  Successful church groups present problems that are worse in the 
short term (more people, more cars, more singing, and more members recruiting others, which 
leads to more people, more singing, etc.), but the trouble is relatively short-lived, because they 
outgrow their family room and need to rent a public place.  Less successful groups continue home 
meetings longer, but are more likely to fit all the cars in their driveway and bother the neighbors 
less.  Thus the problems usually wash out – either the group grows and moves into a more 
conventional church building, or dwindles and presents no concerns for outsiders.  It is 
understandable that local officials have initial concerns about the cars parked on the street, but it is 
a feature of American religious freedom – there’s not a good way around it.  This feature of 
American religious freedom – basically, religious innovation starting from the home to avoid 
prohibitive startup costs – parallels the other types of freedom for innovation in our society.  
While new commercial ventures are sometimes spawned by the R&D branches of existing 
corporate conglomerates, the kid-in-his-garage-inventing-Apple-computers is the stuff of urban 
legends, and inspirational testimonial to capitalism and freedom.  Some of the best things in 
America came from someone’s home. 
The current system, however, tips the scales a little bit away from religious freedom or 
innovation.  Property tax exemptions, for example, mostly benefit churches with elaborate 
buildings and prime real estate.  These tend to be older, wealthier, institutionalized churches (with 
occasional bizarre exceptions, of course) or churches whose priority is to invest their donor’s 
offerings in luxurious digs. The legal scheme favoring grandiose church buildings creates an 
entrenchment effect, a type of entry barrier for newer churches who must rent their space.  Rent 
will be high enough to cover the landlord’s property taxes.  Though small and strapped for cash, 
they are taxed indirectly for their meeting place; entrenched wealthy churches are not.  This is a 
shame, because often the priorities of newer churches are to bring valuable services to the 
community, and to preach a message that challenges us instead of indulging our complacency.  
Similarly, immigrant churches are often newer and smaller, and unable to get a building (though 
some do).  Groups with new, valuable insights, or updated ways of presenting their beliefs, often 
have the same plight. This is not, however, a call for the abolition of religious tax exemptions.  
Taxing church properties would be politically infeasible and would have a chilling effect on 
religion generally; it’s probably better not to touch it.  Removing the exemptions would also have 
the perverse effect of forcing more churches to have shabby or even marginally unsafe facilities 
(or to crowd into homes even more often and for longer terms), and this would be a net social loss 
for many communities.  On the other hand, an irony of the current system is a chilling effect on 
some new churches that may have valuable things to offer.  
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results from excessive rigidity in government.  The perfect system would 
allow for incremental change, progress that involves significant 
transaction costs and delay, but allows for some change nonetheless. 
This seems to be the system our Constitution gave us.  With the 
possible exception of moments of national crisis, it is usually very difficult 
for our government to get anything done – and very difficult for anyone to 
get the government to act.65 The branches pull against each other, and the 
municipal, state, and federal counterparts keep one another in check.  This 
is very frustrating when we want something done quickly (like immediate 
relief after a natural disaster), but very comforting when it comes time to 
invest money, save money, or even earn money.  It has always been a very 
good bet in America that five years hence things would be mostly the 
same.  It is extraordinarily unlikely that the United States will become an 
Afghanistan or Cameroon within a decade.  Citizens in Cameroon, 
unfortunately, get little payoff from investing anything, nor reward for 
 
65 James Liebman and Brandon Garrett offer an interesting discussion of this idea – albeit 
in passing – in a recent article where they show that James Madison’s view of “equal protection” 
was really “entirely negative: freedom from instability and conflict.”  James S. Liebman and 
Brandon L. Garrett, Madisonian Equal Protection, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 837, 875 (2004). See also 
Jonathan Turley, Senate Trials and Factional Disputes: Impeachment as a Madisonian Device, 49 
DUKE L. J. 1, 109-111 (1999). 
Review Essay of Radicals in Robes Dru Stevenson 
 34
saving up, and little compensation for working harder or smarter.  There 
is no incentive to do anything.66 
C. Reason and Rights 
Admittedly, it is a bit audacious to claim that the beauty of our 
Constitution is the inefficient, almost-inert government it created.  The 
long-standing tradition is to extol instead the rights and freedoms the 
Constitution supposedly bestows.   
We could conceive of a much smaller Constitution that actually 
restricted the government even more, if the whole point was making the 
government leave everyone alone.  We could certainly be a little more 
free, and it is undeniable that we could have more guaranteed rights 
(other countries have lengthy lists of rights and entitlements our 
Constitution omits). 
The problem here is that Constitutional writers, like Sunstein, are 
locked into the idea that rights flow out of our human dignity or some 
other metaphysical ideal.  At least for the sake of argument, for now let us 
discuss rights simply as roadblocks to government action, regardless of 
 
66 Stability does tend to depress voter turnout in elections, because less is at stake.  Whether this is 
a good thing or bad thing is a matter of personal opinion – to some extent it represents that voters 
will be almost equally happy with either candidate, knowing that so little is likely to change. 
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whether the action would be good or bad.67 Rights are road blocks, 
dilatory and obstructionist instruments that slow the rate of change.68 In 
this sense, even the Bill of Rights encourages government inefficiency and 
inertia, which in turn creates optimal conditions for prosperity and 
growth. 
Even when we discuss rights in the conventional way, as necessary 
corollaries of human dignity, it is not clear that this notion applies with 
the same force to individually articulated rights as much as it does to the 
more abstract notion that some rights ought to exist and have state 
protection.  If we think of rights in general as encumbrances on 
government action, then the exact list of rights may not matter as much as 
 
67 I recognize that some commentators distinguish between civil “liberties” and civil 
“rights,” but this seems to be a technical usage for the purpose of discussing whether the 
Constitution promises positive entitlements from the government, as opposed to promising the 
government will leave people alone.  See, e.g. John C. Howell, Competing Visions Of Equality, 32 
S.U. L. REV. 197, 201 (2005) (“Civil rights, in contrast with civil liberties which are limitations on 
government action, specify what the government must do to ensure equal protection and freedom 
from discrimination.”).  From this semantic perspective, I am using “rights” the way Howell uses 
“civil liberties,” but I think my usage is more commonplace. I should also clarify that I am 
sidestepping the classic debate between “private rights theory” and “public rights theory,” because 
my analysis is more of a positivist perspective. For a good explanation of the private-public right 
terminology – which I am distinguishing from the argument here – see Gregory P. Magarian, The 
First Amendment, The Public-Private Distinction, and Nongovernmental Suppression of Wartime 
Political Debate, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 101, 110 (2004). 
68 See Randy E. Barnett, Reconceiving the Ninth Amendment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 12 (1988) 
("Constitutional rights can be conceived as 'power-constraints' that regulate the exercise of power 
by Congress and the executive branch ....").  Barnett argues that the Supreme Court, in fact, treats 
rights in the manner I am describing when the government action in question relates to an 
enumerated power, but he discusses are other rights that some commentators call “rights-powers.”  
Id. at 12-13.  The difference seems semantic; it is possible to think of rights, at least in theory, not 
as something we have ex ante that should be immune to government infringement, but rather as 
the void left when the government is shut out of some area of our lives.  
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how many rights are on the protected list, and how general or elastic they 
are.  For example, a narrower right of free speech (like they have in 
Germany) might be offset by a more expansive or absolute right of a free 
press (which is not the same thing), or a more elastic, inclusive right of 
free association.  If the overall quantum of our freedom depends on how 
much we shackle the government, then which rights we have may matter 
less than how many.   
Of course, the semantics of a delineated right make a difference. 
“Due process” – an incredibly vague phrase, requiring so many ex ante 
conclusions that it approaches a tautology – is certainly a bigger 
impediment to hasty government action than, say, the right to refuse 
quartering soldiers in one’s home during peacetime.  Perhaps we could 
imagine assigning weighted values to different rights, depending solely 
on how obstructionist they are to government intervention.69 We could 
give the Third Amendment, say, a “2,” and give the Fourteenth 
Amendment a “9,” and the Presentment Clause a “4.”  Then we could 
think about an algorithm – or even a simply sum – for how much 
 
69 Sunstein does the opposite, I feel, putting the availability of over-the-counter 
contraceptives on the same level as unspecified provisions of the Clean Air Act and OSHA; the 
need for modest gun-control regulations on the same level as his fear that individual states will 
establish official churches that they subsidize; and racial discrimination on the same level as the 
Endangered Species Act. SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 1-3. 
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resistance value we have from the Constitution overall.  The overall 
resistance quotient would matter much more than its individual 
components in creating a free society, as long as we end up with the same 
number.  We could substitute some rights for others, as long as we are 
careful not to substitute rights with differing resistance values.  Forfeiting 
the Fourteenth Amendment, for example, would require some number of 
smaller-valued rights to make up for it.  The point is that such exchanges 
are possible, and the Framers (and subsequent Supreme Court decisions) 
engaged in just this type of trading to preserve a rough equilibrium. 
Rights are roadblocks to governmental action, just like the checks 
and balances provided by the three branches, and the fifty regional 
version of the same regime.  The roadblocks are good, not because 
government is bad, but because uncertainty is bad.  The government is in 
the unique position of being either the great stabilizer or the ultimate 
destabilizer of society.  Rights are simply an accessory in the government-
inertia program of the Constitution. 
Turning now to Sunstein’s book, it is clear that he is exactly right 
about judges.  Radical moves by the judiciary are horrible, something we 
should avoid.  Our quality of life depends on systemic stability and 
minimal uncertainty – not perfect stability, but a high degree of it.  The 
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concern is not so much that Scalia and Thomas will convince the other 
justices to make a singularly bad decision, trampling on something we 
hold dear.  The concern is living with loose cannons in high places, period.  
Incrementalism is the warp and woof of the Constitutional scheme, and 
we need judges who understand that and act accordingly.  
Undoubtedly this free-market-based incrementalism view of 
“rights” – essentially a negative view - will bother those who feel 
passionate about certain rights or issues.70 We all (including this author) 
have deeply-held views about some things, like abortion, and we would 
feel triumphant (and perhaps would gloat a bit) if things went our way, 
once and for all, on this point.  Even so we do not want Supreme Court 
Justices who are doing to fix overnight everything that is wrong with 
America.  Even if they could do this, it would be bad for the economy.  We 
cannot afford the prospect of repeated, unforeseeable shocks to the 
system. 
 
70 On the other hand, this negative view of rights seems to be the working paradigm of 
the American Civil Liberties Union, a group devoted to rights.  “[T]he ACLU seeks to enforce 
limitations on government action --negative rights. The government may not interfere with our 
freedom of speech or the freedom of the press and so forth. The ACLU has not championed the 
affirmative entitlements. . .” Nadine Strossen, What Constitutes Full Protection of Fundamental 
Freedoms? 15  HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 43, 45 (1992). 
Review Essay of Radicals in Robes Dru Stevenson 
 39
Abortion brings up another issue, one that Sunstein does not 
discuss:71 the possibility of the single-issue radical judge.  Sunstein’s 
dreaded “radicals” have a comprehensive agenda, which is what makes 
them so dangerous, such loose cannons.  Compared to these “big picture” 
ideologues, a singe-issue combatant seems rather harmless. Consider the 
example of a judicial nominee whose sole purpose in life is to overturn Roe 
v. Wade (not unlike single-issue anti-war politicians in the Viet Nam era).  
Our confirmation hearings for judges now focus too much on screening 
out single-issue activists, and not enough on screening out the next Earl 
Warren or Clarence Thomas.  The “abortion” judge may be dead wrong 
on that issue (depending on one’s perspective), but a single predictable 
change in our system is not as fearsome as annual sweeping changes in an 
unknown number of areas.  Swinging the wrong way on a single issue 
creates a confined problem, which we can work to undo, or work around.  
This harkens back to the earlier discussion of the problem with a moral or 
deontological justification for “minimalism” – single, isolated mistakes are 
not the problem, because the next generation of courageous judges will 
correct them (albeit always to the consternation of some in the academy).  
 
71 Instead, Sunstein treats abortion as a single-issue constraint for liberals in thinking 
about blocking Supreme Court appointments by Republican presidents, and merely one of many 
issues important to conservatives.  Id. at 104. 
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The problem is not the one bad case, but the jack-in-the-box judge, whose 
timing and direction one never can know. 
 
D. The Nondelegation Doctrine 
Sunstein devotes a chapter of his book (Chapter Eight)72 to 
attacking the nondelegation doctrine (the idea that the Constitution limits 
how much the government – especially the Legislature – can delegate its 
power to other agents), and calls it a “long-dead idea from the early 
twentieth century” on the first page of the book.73 This treatment was 
surprising.  First, Sunstein himself published an article74 in the recent past 
extolling the “nondelegation cannons” enshrined under other names.75 
The opening line declared, “Reports of the death of the nondelegation 
doctrine have been greatly exaggerated. Rather than having been 
abandoned, the doctrine has merely been renamed and relocated. Its 
current home consists of a set of nondelegation canons, which forbid 
executive agencies from making certain decisions on their own.”76 It was 
surprising, therefore, to see him now call the nondelegation doctrine a 
 
72 SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 199-216. 
73 Id. at 1. 
74 See Cass Sunstein, Nondelegation Cannons, 67 U. CHI. LAW REV. 315 (2000). 
75 Id. at 329-30. 
76 Id. at 315.  It appears Sunstein recycled the material from this article on pp 211-15 of 
Radicals in Robes, except in a watered down version emphasizing the need for judicial inaction. 
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“long dead idea from the early twentieth century” on the opening page of 
his new book.77 
A more important reason that Sunstein’s disavowal is surprising is 
that it is a quintessentially “minimalist” or incrementalist device.  
Properly understood, the doctrine keeps power in the hands of the turgid 
government and out of the hands of delegates who could go do something 
quick and drastic – especially private individuals.  This was, in fact, the 
occasion for the doctrine’s explicit use in the few cases where the Court 
employed it: an individual agent had received too much unfettered 
discretion and power to really mess things up, or even to act out of private 
vested interests.  As such, the nondelegation doctrine is at he core of the 
Constitution, or better yet, embodies everything I have been saying: it 
prevents quick, drastic use of government power that would shock the 
system.  Even the existence of agents with such power and discretion 
poses a threat of uncertainty, and is therefore undesirable. 
 
77 Sunstein’s current repudiation of the doctrine was also surprising because the 
nondelegation doctrine is one point that has pitted his three named foes – Scalia, 
Ginsburg, and Thomas – against each other, rather acrimoniously in fact.  In American 
Trucking, 531 U.S. 457 (2001), Justice Scalia verbally spanked the D.C. Circuit – i.e., Judge 
Ginsburg – for using the nondelegation doctrine to invalidate EPA regulations.  It is true 
that Scalia formally pronounced the doctrine alive and well in this case (contrary to 
Sunstein and his colleagues at the University of Chicago have written), but he insisted 
that it is a narrow rule, a last resort, and that it restricts the power of judges as much as 
legislators or agencies.  One would have thought that Sunstein might like something that 
so divided his opponents. 
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In this sense, the nondelegation doctrine never lapsed or 
languished, but rather operated under the rubric of the due process 
clause.  There is no “Nondelegation Clause” in the Constitution, so 
naturally courts would cite an existing passage – like the Fourteenth 
Amendment – when deciding a case that limits the power of private 
actors.  It also makes sense that courts never used it against administrative 
agencies per se, because bureaucracies pose none of the threats that the 
nondelegation doctrine really contemplates. Bureaucracies are nearly as 
inert an inefficient as the rest of the government, if not more so.  
Meanwhile, the invalidations by courts of private actor delegations have 
continued to this day. 
One example Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation v. Lewellyn.78 
This case invalidated a state statute that gave a private board of cotton-
growers sweeping police powers to eradicate crop pests (boll weevils).79 
Local farm owners comprised the board, using their power against 
competitors in the area, forcing them to raze their fields to stop dubious 
outbreaks of the pestilence.  The Texas Supreme Court found this 
 
78 Tex. Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc. v. Lewellyn, 952 S.W.2d 454 (Tex. 1997). 
The decision reviews some of the leading articles and treatises on the nondelegation doctrine in 
recent times, and its eight-part test is essentially an amalgamation of what it found in the academic 
scholarship in this area. 
79 Id. at 460-61. 
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delegation to a private group to be much more troubling than delegations 
to administrative agencies: 
[P]rivate delegations clearly raise even more troubling 
constitutional issues than their public counterparts. On a 
practical basis, the private delegate may have a personal or 
pecuniary interest which is inconsistent with or repugnant to 
the public interest to be served. More fundamentally, the 
basic concept of democratic rule under a republican form of 
government is compromised when public powers are 
abandoned to those who are neither elected by the people, 
appointed by a public official or entity, nor employed by the 
government. Thus, we believe it axiomatic that courts 
should subject private delegations to a more searching 
scrutiny than their public counterparts.80 
The problem of unchecked self-interest (and conflicts of interest) on 
the part of the private parties presents the crux of the legal problem. The 
United States Supreme Court has occasionally reviewed cases where state 
judges were given a financial interest in the outcome of the cases they 
decided, whether directly or indirectly, and has always held that such a 
situation violates the Due Process Clause.81 For example, in Tumey v. 
 
80 Id. at 469. 
81 Interestingly, James Madison alludes to the very problem I discuss here in The 
Federalist when he talks about factions as destabilizing elements in society: 
No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest would 
certainly bias his judgment, and not improbably, corrupt his integrity.  With 
equal, nay, with greater reason, a body of men are unfit to be both judges and 
parties at the same time; yet what are many of the most important acts of 
legislation, but so many judicial determinations, not indeed concerning the rights 
of single persons, but concerning the rights of large bodies of citizens? 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
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Ohio,82 the Court overturned a criminal conviction because the judge had a 
direct pecuniary interest in the fine exacted.  Similarly, in Ward v. Village of 
Monroeville,83 the Court found it unconstitutional – on due process 
grounds, naturally – to have a local adjudicator whose compensation 
scheme could affect the way cases came out.  In Bennett v. Cottingham,84 an 
adjudicator's compensation consisted of the traffic fines he imposed - and 
this, the Court held, was unconstitutional.  A more nuanced example is 
Brown v. Vance,85 considering a scheme in which judges received a flat fee 
per case they heard, and creditors could select the judge hearing their 
case.  This created an incentive for a judge to give favorable rulings to 
creditors, so that creditors would file more frequently in courts of judges 
who tended to favor plaintiffs, which increased the judge's "business" or 
income. The result was the same – an unconstitutional delegation of 
power to an individual that violated the due process clause. 
 Another example is Judge Posner’s Club Misty decision,86 which 
 
82 273 U.S. 510 (1927). 
83 409 U.S. 57 (1972). 
84 290 F. Supp. 759 (N.D. Ala. 1968), aff'd, 393 U.S. 317 (1969) (mem.). 
85 637 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1981). 
86 Club Misty, Inc. v. Laski, 208 F.3d 615 (7th Cir. 2000). "Club Misty" was the name of 
a local watering hole whose clientele was unsavory to area residents.  A local business competitor 
organized area residents, and together they brought about the revocation of the establishment's 
liquor license. The unusual delegation mechanism differed from the standard public hearings held 
by zoning and planning boards before issuing liquor licenses.  Local boards typically retain the 
power to make an independent decision, while in this case the neighborhood residents had the 
power to actually bind the board's decision. 
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involved  involving a Chicago ordinance that allowed a neighborhood 
referendum to control the granting or revocation of liquor licenses. Voters 
could bypass the political process and simply control the actions of the 
liquor commission via referendum fiat.87 The court saw a significant 
distinction between delegations of rule-making power, which affect a 
general class, and delegations of adjudicative power, which determine the 
rights of an individual. Mere delegation of rule-making power is more 
likely to survive judicial scrutiny: the legislature can empower voters to 
act legislatively, as in a normal public referendum, provided that the 
action "is on the legislative side of the legislative/judicial divide."88 On 
the other hand, delegating judicial-type decision-making to private parties 
is "what the Due Process Clause prohibits."89 In another example, General 
Electric Co. v. New York Department of Labor ("GE"),90 the Second Circuit 
 
87 Id. 208 F.3d at 615. For an almost identical set of facts in a state supreme court case, 
see Du Pont v. Liquor Control Commission, 71 A.2d 84, 85 (Conn. 1949) ("since no standard 
whatever is prescribed to guide, limit, or control the reactions of those comprising the fifty-one 
percent [of the voters], a decision by them based upon whim, fancy, prejudice, caprice or other ill-
founded motive would suffice under the ordinance."). Club Misty involved a statutory scheme 
enabling local residents to terminate another's liquor license through a process of circulating 
petitions and forcing a public referendum, while Du Pont involved the liquor commission 
acquiescing to whatever suspicious scheme a local municipality used to attack liquor proprietors. 
88Club Misty, 208 F.3d at 622. Posner's distinction between "legislative" and 
"adjudicative" activities tracks the distinction made by the Administrative Procedures Act for 
agency actions, but here the distinction is applied to the types of activities being delegated to 
private parties. See 5 U.S.C. §  558 (2002).  
89 Club Misty, 208 F.3d at 622.  
90 936 F.2d 1448 (2nd Cir. 1991). The statute at issue required the Department of Labor to 
establish fair wages for government contracts based on a review of private-sector contracts for the 
same type of work. The electricians' union, however, drafted its private contracts to delineate two 
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invalidated New York's "prevailing wage" law under the nondelegation 
doctrine; the regime in place permitted private parties to control 
government actions toward others. The court observed that “this would 
clearly establish an unconstitutional delegation of authority under the 
statute as applied.”91 
Private-party delegations, whether in the form of government 
outsourcing of decision-making (privatization92) or referendum-style 
ordinances, allow parties to take the power and run with it.  Even though 
it is possible that the parties would act in an altruistic or noble manner, 
 
categories of "work," one with wage rates double that of the other. The second, higher category 
was crafted in a way so that it would always serve as the reference for the Department of Labor in 
setting rates for government contracts, ensuring high wages (double) for those jobs. The first 
category would actually be the controlling feature for the private contract, enabling the contractor 
to be competitive in the private market while reserving future above-market prices for forthcoming 
government jobs. General Electric (GE), via a subsidiary, was under contract with the State of 
New York for service and repair of railroad electrical transformers. GE paid its unionized workers 
the hourly wage normally paid in the private sector. Union workers, however, were used to 
receiving double the usual market price when working under government contracts. The New 
York Department of Labor then commenced proceedings to impose substantial fines on GE for 
failing to pay the "prevailing wage" for this type of work. 
91 Id. at 1459. See also Osius v. St. Clair Shores, 75 N.W.2d 25 (Mich. 1956) (striking 
down statute that allowed public hearings on zoning applications to control outcome); Revne v. 
Trade Comm'n, 192 P.2d 563 (Utah 1948); Union Trust Co. v. Simmons, 211 P.2d 190 (Utah 
1949).  Even Noam Chomsky has expressed doubt about the delegation of power inherent in 
privatization schemes, and the ability of regulations or standards to rein in the self-interest of 
corporate contractors once privatization has taken place: "There will, of course, be regulations.... 
But there are so many ways around regulations, especially if you're rich and powerful and have a 
lot of lawyers. That's not a big problem. It's just like there are regulations around worker safety." 
NOAM CHOMSKY & DAVID BARSAMIAN, PROPAGANDA AND THE PUBLIC MIND 103 (2001) 
92 In two earlier articles, I addressed the connection between privatization of government 
services and the nondelegation doctrine at more length: Privatization of Welfare Services: 
Delegation by Commercial Contract, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 83 (2003), and Privatized Welfare and the 
Nondelegation Doctrine, 35 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 546 (2002).  Subsequently, Gillian Metzger 
offered a superior treatment of the subject in Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV.
1367 (2003). 
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the uncertainty that results is a real hazard.  Sunstein is right to be 
somewhat dismissive of Judge Ginsburg’s desire to use the doctrine to 
dismantle any administrative agency he dislikes.  The reason to dismiss 
such silliness, however, is not that the nondelegation doctrine is old or out 
of fashion, or even because he it is wrong to dislike the EPA, but because 
bureaucracies pose little threat of shocks; in fact, bureaucracies do more to 
reduce uncertainty (because of their comprehensive regulatory 
frameworks) than any another governmental entity.   
 
III. CONCLUSION 
Sunstein says the right thing for the wrong reasons.  His rebuttals 
to originalism are well done, and inform the debate on these points, but he 
could offer a better argument for incrementalism than merely attacking 
the main alternative approach.  His incrementalist program does not have 
to stand as the last report after he has repudiated every other option. 
Instead, incrementalism can stand on its own as the necessary component 
of a system that encourages work, savings, and investment. 
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Unfortunately, Sunstein spends most of his book on negating the 
views of three judges, and offering tenuous philosophical reasons for his 
“minimalism.”  It this sense, it makes a very small, modest contribution to 
the existing mountain of academic literature on originalism.  Professors 
can be minimalists, too.  
 
